Defendant municipal court judge and petitioner criminal defendants sought, in separate actions, to void the judgment of respondent Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (California), restraining defendant municipal court judge from taking any further proceedings in certain actions other than to disqualify herself and set the matters for hearing before another judge.
In a prosecution for prostitution, the people sought to disqualify defendant municipal court judge pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 170.6. Defendant judge refused to disqualify herself and the people sought a writ of mandate in the superior court. Petitioner criminal defendants then filed an action seeking a writ of mandate to disqualify respondent superior court judge from deciding the first action, after he refused to disqualify himself upon petitioners’ § 170.6 motion. The court of appeal issued an alternative writ. San Diego ADA attorney The reviewing court dismissed the first action’s appeal and issued the requested writ in the second action. The court reaffirmed that § 170.6 did not violate the doctrine of the separation of powers or impair the independence of the judiciary. In two successive § 170.6 actions a party could disqualify the judge in the later action without waiving that right by failing to so request in the earlier. Prejudice could properly be declared as the ground of such disqualification, and it was wholly unnecessary for the legislature to attempt to list the many conceivable factors which might cause a judge to be prejudiced. Thus, both judges should have recused themselves.
The court dismissed the appeal in the first action. In the second action, the court issued a peremptory writ of mandate to compel respondent superior court to vacate his order denying petitioner criminal defendants’ motion to disqualify him. All parties were to bear their own costs.
The Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) declared that former Food & Agr. Code, § 12811.5, prohibited defendant Director of the California Department of Pesticide Regulation from considering plaintiff pesticide manufacturers’ original data when considering defendant competitor’s registration application. The trial court rejected other challenges to pesticide regulatory actions. The parties cross appealed.
The manufacturers submitted data in their applications for pesticide registration. The agency did not require the competitor to submit such data in connection with its applications, and the manufacturers did not consent to the competitor’s use of their data. The court held that Food & Agr. Code, §§ 12825, 12827, 12828, did not require exhaustion of administrative remedies. The court stated that consideration of data, within the meaning of former Food & Agr. Code, § 12811.5, encompassed reliance on data submitted by another applicant, whether or not actually submitted or reviewed. Pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 1062, a declaratory judgment did not preclude injunctive relief under Civ. Code, § 3422. Triable factual issues existed as to whether the agency’s use of trade secret data was an unconstitutional taking and whether misappropriation of trade secrets occurred under Civ. Code, § 3426.1. An equal protection argument lacked merit. A notice and regulatory amendments were regulations as defined in Gov. Code, § 11342.600, and were invalid under Gov. Code, § 11340.5, subd. (a), for failure to comply with the California Administrative Procedure Act, Gov. Code, § 11400 et seq.
The court affirmed the grant of declaratory relief as modified. The court otherwise reversed with directions to vacate the summary adjudication against the counts alleging unauthorized consideration of data, unlawful taking, and violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act; to grant summary adjudication finding the notice and amendments invalid; to overrule the demurrers to the count for a writ of mandate; and to conduct further proceedings.